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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1, Whether an employer has met its burden of rebutting an employee's 
testimonial evidence of the number of hours worked by the employee for purposes of 
overtime compensation under the FLSA, when the employer did not keep the required 
records of the employee's work hours but presented evidence regarding the same which 
the trial court found more credible than the evidence presented by the employee. 
Standard of Review. Because there is no mandate to apply federal standards of 
review with respect to this issue of substantive federal law, the standard of review is a 
question to be determined by the laws of the State of Utah, which is the forum state. See 
State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 323 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Under Utah law, the trial 
court's conclusions as to the legal effect of its findings of fact are ordinarily reviewed for 
correctness. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234,1244 (Utah 1998). However, the trial 
court is given broad discretion in applying the law to its findings of fact where '"the trial 
judge has observed 'facts,' such as witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the 
application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to 
appellate courts.'" IcL (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)). 
This issue was preserved by Appellant for appeal at R. 51-55, and R. 73, at 4-12. 
Issue 2. Whether an isolated statement by counsel during closing arguments 
required the trial court to reopen the evidence and allow additional evidence to rebut the 
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statement, where no harm resulted therefrom and the movant otherwise had ample 
opportunity to move for admission of the evidence during trial. 
Standard of Review. The denial of a motion to reopen the evidence is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion. See Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1976). 
This issue was preserved by Appellant for appeal at R. 73, at 23-27. 
DETERMINATIVE LEGISLATION 
Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations of central 
importance to this appeal are as follows: 
• 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) regarding compensation for overtime pay under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. The statute is set forth in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This case involves an appeal of the trial court's 
determination that Daday failed to prove he was entitled to overtime compensation under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, because it found the evidence presented by Daday's 
employer, R.D. Logging, more credible than the evidence presented by Daday with 
respect to Daday's work hours. Additionally, this case involves an appeal of the trial 
court's refusal to grant Daday's motion to reopen the evidence during closing arguments 
to allow submission of an interrogatory answer into evidence. 
B, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. On August 26,1999, Daday 
filed suit against R.D. Logging in the Fifth District Court for Washington County, 
alleging, inter alia, that R.D. Logging violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to 
pay Daday overtime compensation. The matter was tried before the Honorable G. Rand 
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Beacham in a bench trial. On March 30,2001, the trial court found that Daday had failed 
to prove that he was entitled to overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act and entered judgment for R.D. Logging. Daday appealed the trial court's decision to 
the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court transferred jurisdiction of the appeal 
to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant/Appellee R.D. Logging, Co., Inc. ("R.D. Logging") is a Utah 
corporation in the business of producing custom cabinets and furniture (R. 59-69). Some 
of R.D. Logging's products have been placed in interstate commerce (R. 60). 
Plaintiff/Appellant Richard S. Daday ("Daday") was employed by R.D. Logging 
as a cabinetmaker from January 1998 through March 1999 (R. 2; 60). R.D. Logging did 
not keep records of Daday's work hours; rather, it tried to get Daday to keep records of 
his work hours but Daday refused to do so (R. 60). As a result, there were no records of 
Daday's actual work hours during his employment with R.D. Logging (R. 60). 
Nonetheless, R.D. Logging paid Daday $720 on a weekly basis, reflecting a wage of 
$18.00 an hour for a 40 hour work week, during the term of his employment, excepting 
the final week thereof (R. 2; 60). 
Daday left R.D. Logging's employ on March 19,1999 (R. 60). On August 26, 
1999, Daday filed suit against R.D. Logging in the Fifth District Court for Washington 
County, alleging, inter alia, that R.D. Logging violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by 
failing to pay Daday overtime compensation in the amount of $28,080.00 (R. 1-3). 
Daday alleged that from January 1,1999 to December 31,1998, he worked 60 hours per 
week and was paid for only 40 hours per week (R. 2). 
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At trial, Daday testified that he consistently worked more than 40 hours per week 
and that 60 hours per week was "a real safe average" of how long he worked (R. 60). 
Daday testified that he began his work day at 6:30 a.m. and that his "average" work day 
ended at 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. (R. 60-61). Daday further testified that he worked 6 or 7 days 
per week until February 1999 (R. 61). Finally, Daday testified that he took smoking 
breaks while at work, that he never smoked in the shop, and that he smoked a pack of 
cigarettes per day (R. 62). 
In addition to Daday's own testimony, Daday also offered the testimony of his 
wife, who testified only that Daday worked many hours at R.D. Logging's shop (R. 60). 
Witnesses for R.D. Logging testified that Daday arrived to work no earlier than 
7:00 a.m., and that while Daday may have been at R.D. Logging's shop as late as 6:00 
p.m., it was not known what Daday was actually doing while on the premises (R. 60-61). 
Witnesses for R.D. Logging further testified that Daday spent significant time on 
personal work during the normal work hours—which he was specifically told not to do— 
on such things as building furniture to exchange for his own automotive repairs and 
building doors to trade for his own countertops (R. 61-62). Furthermore, there was 
testimony that Daday parked his own travel trailer next to R.D. Logging's shop and 
worked on the reconstruction and remodeling of the interior during normal work hours, 
which improvements would have required 3 or 4 complete weeks of work to accomplish 
(R. 61). 
During closing arguments and after the evidence had been closed, counsel for 
R.D. Logging stated that any time spent by Daday at the shop in excess of 40 hours per 
week was dedicated to personal projects (R. 73, at 20). Counsel for Daday objected, 
arguing that in an answer to an interrogatory R.D. Logging had stated that Daday may 
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have worked an average of 45 hours per week (R. 73, at 21). At no time prior had Daday 
offered the interrogatory into evidence (R. 73, at 21). However, Daday's counsel 
asserted that R.D. Logging "bound themselves to at least 45 hours per week in [sic] 
interrogatories." (R. 73, at 21). 
Because Daday had failed to enter the interrogatory into evidence or otherwise 
present it to the trial court, he made an oral motion to reopen the evidence and submit the 
answer to the interrogatory (R. 73, at 23-24). Upon questioning by the court, counsel for 
R.D. Logging stated that he would continue his argument based on the evidence that was 
introduced at trial (R. 73, at 25). After argument from Daday's counsel, the trial court 
took the matter under advisement (R. 73, at 26). The trial court never definitively ruled 
on the motion. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court found the evidence 
presented by R.D. Logging with respect to the hours worked by Daday more credible 
than the evidence presented by Daday (R. 63). The trial court concluded that Daday "had 
[presented] no credible evidence of any specific number of hours worked in any specific 
week," and that Daday's testimony with respect to the same was "speculative, 
unsubstantiated, and unreliable." (R. 60). In sum, the trial court found that Daday's 
testimony failed "to account for the time he took for smoking breaks, and worked on 
personal projects rather than for [R.D. Logging], and is contradicted by more credible 
evidence." (R. 62-63). 
The trial court held that while R.D. Logging had violated the Fair Labor 
Standards Act by failing to keep records of Daday's work hours, Daday failed to bear his 
burden of proof for an award of overtime compensation (R. 62-63). Thus, the trial court 
entered judgment for R.D. Logging (R. 63). Daday appeals. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In a situation where an employee brings suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
against an employer for payment of overtime compensation and the employer has failed 
to keep records as required by federal regulations, the employee has the burden of 
proving he performed work for which he was improperly compensated. Once the 
employee presents prima facie evidence of his work hours, the burden shifts to the 
employer to present evidence to negate the reasonableness of any inference to be drawn 
from the employee's evidence. 
In the instant case, the trial court clearly found R.D. Logging's evidence more 
credible than Daday's with respect to the number of hours worked by Daday. Therefore, 
R.D. Logging met its burden under the applicable standard, and the trial court was correct 
in holding that Daday was not entitled to payment of overtime compensation. 
Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant 
Daday's motion to reopen the evidence to allow admission of an interrogatory answer in 
response to an isolated statement by R.D. Logging's counsel during closing argument for 
the following reasons. First, the statement was an isolated one which resulted in no harm 
to Daday as there is no evidence in the record to show that it factored in to the trial 
court's decision. Second, Daday had ample opportunity to submit the interrogatory into 
evidence during the trial but failed to do so. As a result, under applicable case law, the 
interest of fairness and substantial justice were met. 
ARGUMENT 
L R.D. LOGGING PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
NEGATE DADAY'S EVIDENCE REGARDING THE HOURS 
HE WORKED AND THEREFORE PRECLUDED RECOVERY 
UNDER THE FLS A. 
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Section 207(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLS A) provides, in relevant 
[N]o employer shall employ any of his employees who in 
any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production 
of goods for commerce . . . for a workweek longer than 
forty hours unless such employee receives compensation 
for his employment in excess of the hours above specified 
at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular 
rate at which he is employed. 
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Additionally, federal regulations require employers to maintain 
and preserve payroll and other records with respect to any employees to which section 
207 of the FLSA applies. See 29 CFR § 516.2. 
The trial court found, and it is otherwise undisputed, that the FLSA applies to 
R.D. Logging. The trial court also found that R.D. Logging failed to keep employment 
records as required by federal regulations. 
In Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.. 328 U.S. 680, 66 S. Ct. 1187 (1946), the 
United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of an employee's burden when bringing 
a suit under the FLSA for unpaid overtime compensation where an employer has failed to 
keep adequate records required by federal regulations. See id. at 687, 666 S. Ct. at 1192. 
The court held that in such a situation 
an employee has carried out his burden if he proves that he 
has in fact performed work for which he was improperly 
compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to 
show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just 
and reasonable inference. The burden then shifts to the 
employer to come forward with evidence of the precise 
amount of work performed or with evidence to negative the 
reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the 
employee's evidence. 
ML at 687-88, 66 S. Ct. at 1523 (emphasis added). 
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Daday argues that because R.D. Logging failed to keep adequate records as 
required by federal regulations, his testimony regarding his work hours constitutes prima 
facie evidence of his entitlement to overtime compensation. However, Daday only 
focuses on the first half of the equation, which is evidenced by the way Daday framed the 
first issue on appeal as whether his testimony constituted prima facie evidence of his 
entitlement to overtime benefits. (Appellant's Brief, at 1.) As Mt. Clemens makes clear, 
however, even where the employee presents such prima facie evidence, the burden shifts 
back to the employer to produce sufficient evidence to negate the reasonableness of any 
inference that could be drawn from the employee's evidence. 
Applying the Mt. Clemens standard to the instant case, it is clear that R.D. 
Logging presented sufficient evidence to negate the reasonableness of any inference that 
could be drawn from the evidence presented by Daday. 
As set forth above, the evidence presented by Daday to show the amount and 
extent of his work for R.D. Logging was his testimony that sixty hours per week was a 
"real safe average" of how long he worked; that he began his work day at 6:30 a.m. and 
that his average work day ended at 6:00 or 7:00 p.m.; that he worked six or seven days . 
per week until February 1999; and his wife's testimony that he worked many hours. 
To rebut this evidence, R.D. Logging presented witnesses who testified that 
Daday arrived to work no earlier than 7:00 a.m.; that Daday spent a significant amount of 
the workday engaged in personal work instead of work for R.D. Logging; that while 
Daday may have been at the shop as late as 6:00 p.m. it was not known whether he was 
actually working or not; and that Daday had parked his own travel trailer next to the shop 
and worked on the reconstruction and remodeling of the same during normal work hours, 
which improvements would have required 3 or 4 complete weeks of work to accomplish. 
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In addition to this evidence, Daday's own testimony revealed that he took smoking 
breaks while at work, that he never smoked in the shop, and that he smoked a pack of 
cigarettes per day. 
As stated, the trial court found Daday's testimony with respect to the hours he 
worked to be "speculative, unsubstantiated, and unreliable." Such testimony failed "to 
account for the time he took for smoking breaks, and worked on personal projects rather 
than for [R.D. Logging], and is contradicted by more credible evidence." (Emphasis 
added.)1 Clearly, then, the trial court found that R.D. Logging's evidence negated the 
reasonableness of any inference that could be drawn from Daday's evidence with respect 
to the hours worked by Daday. Applying the law to its factual findings, the trial court 
determined that Daday failed to prove his entitlement to overtime compensation under the 
FLSA. 
As set forth above, while this Court should review the trial court's decision for 
correctness, the trial court is nonetheless entitled to broad discretion because its factual 
findings involved a determination of the credibility of testimonial evidence and the 
application of the law to the same. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998). 
Because information such as witness demeanor and appearance is not available to this 
1
 The determination by the trial court that Daday did not work an average of 60 hours per 
week was a factual determination made by the trial court after assessing the credibility of 
the witnesses who testified with respect to the issue. Trial courts "are accorded wide 
latitude in determining factual matters [because] [t]hey are in the best position to assess 
the credibility of the witnesses and to gain a sense of the proceeding as a whole." 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 314 (Utah 1998). Indeed, "[w]here contradictory 
evidence is offered by two witnesses, 'the fact finder is free to weigh the conflicting 
evidence presented and to draw its own conclusions.'" IdL (citing State v. Pierce, 772 
P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986)). 
Moreover, and to the extent that Daday takes issue with the trial court's findings 
in this regard, Daday failed to properly challenge the same as he failed to marshal the 
evidence. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 
1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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Court, it should accord the trial court more discretion with respect to its conclusions of 
law. IcL Judged by this standard, this Court should summarily affirm the trial court's 
decision. 
Daday cites to several cases in support of his argument that he has met his burden 
of showing he is entitled to overtime compensation under the FLSA because of his oral 
testimony regarding the hours he has worked and R.D. Logging's failure to keep 
adequate records of the same. However, each such case is distinguishable from the 
instant case. 
In Wirtz v. McClure, 333 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1964), the employee testified that the 
hours he worked followed a precise work schedule, which required the employee, who 
was a truck driver, to be in certain cities at certain, predetermined times. See id. at 46. 
The employer did not keep proper records of the employee's daily or weekly hours and 
presented no evidence to negate the employee's prima facia case for unpaid minimum 
wages and overtime compensation under the FLSA. See id. at 46-47. Rather, the 
employer's defense was that the employee was an independent contractor. See id. at 47. 
In the instant case, Daday presented no specific evidence, such as a certain and 
predetermined work schedule from which the trial court could make a fair determination 
of Daday's actual working hours. As stated by the trial court, Daday "specifically 
testified, 'You can't imagine the hours I put in in that place,' but then left it to this Court 
to do that imagining." (R. 63). More importantly, R.D. Logging presented evidence that 
negated the reasonableness of any inference that could be drawn from Daday's 
testimonial evidence, which the employer in Wirtz specifically failed to do. 
In Porter v. Poindexten 158 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1947), the employee testified that 
he worked from 7:00 p.m. until 5:00 a.m., with the exception of Saturday and Sunday 
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when he left work at 6:00, and that he worked seven additional hours each week 
collecting on his employer's accounts. See id. at 761. In defense, the employer argued 
that, among other things, the employee's testimony of the time he worked was based 
upon speculation, guess, and conjecture. See id. at 760. What the employer in Porter did 
not do, however, is rebut the employee's evidence of his hours worked with evidence of 
its own. Therefore, the court held in favor of the employee, finding that the employer 
had failed to meet the standard imposed upon it by Mt. Clemens. See id. at 761- 62. 
In the instant case, the trial court did find that Daday's evidence was speculative, 
but it did so after finding the evidence presented by R.D. Logging more credible. Thus, 
R.D. Logging did what the employer in Porter failed to do to: rebut the speculative 
evidence presented by the employee with evidence of its own. 
In Bledsoe v. Wirtz, 384 F.2d 767 (10th Cir. 1976), the employee testified that he 
worked seven days a week and averaged 70 hours per week at work. See id. at 771. In 
response, the employer argued that its business was a seasonable one and that the 
employee could not possibly have spent sufficient hours working to bring his yearly total 
to a 70 hour average. See id. at 771. Aside from such testimony regarding the nature of 
its business, the employer presented no evidence with respect to the employee's actual 
work hours. See id. The court held that the employer's testimony fell short of the 
requirements of Mt. Clemens because it did nothing to rebut the evidence presented by 
the employee. See id. 
In the instant case, R.D. Logging did not present general evidence regarding the 
nature of its business as the employer in Bledsoe did. Rather, R.D. Logging's evidence 
went directly to the actual time Daday spent at work and what he actually did while there. 
This is certainly within the requirements contemplated by Mt. Clemens. 
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In sum, the instant case is distinguishable from Wirtz. Porter, and Bledsoe for the 
simple reason that R.D. Logging did in fact rebut the testimonial evidence presented by 
Daday and negated the reasonableness of any inference that could be drawn therefrom. 
Therefore, R.D. Logging met the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Mt. 
Clemens. 
Finally, Daday takes issue with the trial court's finding that his smoking breaks 
were relevant in determining how many hours he actually spent working. Daday argues 
that the FLSA specifically allows an employee "idle" time. In support of his argument 
Daday cites 29 CFR § 778.223 regarding pay for "non-productive hours." This 
regulation states, in relevant part, "working time is not limited to the hours spent in active 
productive labor, but includes time given by the employee to the employer even though 
part of the time may be spent in idleness." 29 CFR § 778.223.2 
In essence, Daday argues that he should have been fully compensated or given 
credit toward working hours for his smoking breaks. However, the trial court's reference 
to Daday's smoking breaks was not the sole basis of its decision as Daday implies. As 
set forth in detail above, the trial court specifically found that Daday had spent a 
considerable amount of time on his own personal projects rather than on actual work for 
R.D. Logging. 29 CFR § 778.223 does not provide and should not be construed to require 
an employer to pay an employee who shows up to work and spends a majority of his time 
engaged in his own personal work. 
While the regulation does provide for compensation for non-productive hours, a 
plain reading of the same contemplates payment for non-productive time such as short 
breaks, lunch breaks, or periodical non-productive time that otherwise serves the 
2
 The full text of this regulation is set forth in Addendum D. 
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employer; rather than spending hours on end doing something other than productive work 
for the employer. See, e.g., Wales v. Jack M. Berry. Inc., 192F.Supp.2d 1269,1289-90 
(M.D. Fla. 1999) (defining "hour worked" under FLSA to include time spent waiting at 
work for a work assignment). 
Furthermore, with regard to Daday's argument as to the effect of 29 CFR § 
778.223, the trial court never had the opportunity to consider the regulation because 
Daday did not present the same to the trial court for its consideration. In the absence of 
plain error, this Court should not review the effect of 29 CFR § 778.223 because Daday 
did not raise it below. See State v. Bums, 2002 UT 56,117,4 P.3d 795. As stated by the 
Utah Supreme Court, "it is unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule correctly on an 
issue it was never given on opportunity to consider." Bums, 2002 UT 56 at fl7. As 
such, this Court should not consider the effect of 29 CFR § 778.223 on the trial court's 
decision. 
Daday's reliance on 29 CFR § 778.223 is therefore misplaced and unsupported by 
the trial court's findings. 
H. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO GRANT DADAY'S MOTION TO REOPEN THE 
EVIDENCE. 
"A motion to reopen to take additional [evidence] when a case has been submitted 
to the court, but prior to the entry of judgment, is addressed to the sound discretion of the 
[trial] court." Lewis v. Porter. 556 P.2d 496,497 (Utah 1976). 
Daday argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to reopen the 
evidence to allow submission of an answer to one of his interrogatories. Daday made his 
motion to reopen the evidence during closing arguments, when counsel for R.D. Logging 
stated that any time Daday spent at the shop in excess of 40 hours was spent on personal 
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projects. (R. 73, at 20; see also Addendum E.) In his brief, Daday asserts that the answer 
would not prejudice R.D. Logging, there would have been no delay in receiving the 
interrogatory into evidence, and there would have been no surprise in its submission into 
evidence. Daday also intimates that the trial court had "a motive" in choosing to "ignore" 
the interrogatory because it contradicted the trial court's finding that Daday's testimony 
lacked credibility. Daday's arguments are without merit. 
First, R.D. Logging's statement that any time spent by Daday at the shop in 
excess of 40 hours was an isolated one, and there is no evidence in the record to suggest 
that the trial court took the same into consideration in rendering its decision. Indeed, 
upon questioning by the trial court, R.D. Logging's counsel stated that he would continue 
his argument based upon the evidence presented at trial, and no further reference was 
made to the substance of the statement. (R. 73, at 25; see also Addendum E.) Therefore, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing submission of the interrogatory 
into evidence after the evidence was closed. 
In addition to the lack of harm Daday suffered from the statement, Daday cannot 
explain why he failed to introduce the interrogatory into evidence during the trial. 
Whatever equitable arguments Daday might make to this Court to convince it that the 
trial court abused its discretion in not allowing submission of the interrogatory, he cannot 
escape the fact that he was in possession of the interrogatory during the trial, and he 
chose to sit on the same and rely on testimonial evidence to prove his work hours. 
Lewis v. Porter presented the Utah Supreme Court with a situation that mirrors 
the one in the instant case. In Lewis, the supreme court held that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reopen the evidence to take additional 
testimony when the case had been submitted to the trial court but prior to entry of 
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judgment. See Lewis, 556 P.2d at 497. The supreme court reasoned that the movant had 
"ample opportunity" to produce his evidence during trial but chose not to do so. See id. 
Therefore, the supreme court reasoned that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to grant the motion to reopen to allow submission of the evidence after the case 
had been submitted to the court. See id. Under such circumstances, the supreme court 
determined that "the denial of [the] motion subserves the interest of fairness and 
substantial justice." Id. 
Daday had the same "ample opportunity" as the movant in Lewis to enter his 
evidence prior to the close of the evidence, but failed to do so. It cannot, therefore, be 
said that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allow submission of the 
interrogatory into evidence. 
Furthermore, Daday's argument that the interrogatory should have been admitted 
on his motion to reopen is self-serving at this point. Throughout the trial, as the record 
makes clear, Daday took the position that he worked an average of 60 hours per week, 
and the evidence Daday chose to present to the trial court was to that effect. It is safe to 
reason that Daday made a tactical decision not to introduce the answer to the 
interrogatory into evidence because the same undercut and contradicted his testimony and 
position as it stated Daday may have worked an average of 45 hours. Certainly, the 
difference in 20 hours per week overtime versus 5 hours per week in overtime is 
considerable for the purposes of damages under the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
Daday should not now be allowed a second bite at the apple because hindsight 
suggests he made a mistake in trial strategy. As stated by the supreme court, "Counsel is 
entitled to control the presentation of evidence, and should there be a failure to present 
evidence on a claim at issue, it is generally viewed as a waiver of the claim." Girard v. 
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Appleby, 660 P.2d 245,247 (Utah 1983), overruled on other grounds by Meadowbrook, 
LLC v. Flower. 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 1998).3 
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant Daday's 
motion to reopen the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, R.D. Logging respectfully requests this Court 
affirm both the trial court's determination that Daday was not entitled to overtime 
compensation under the FLSA, and its refusal to grant Daday's motion to reopen the 
evidence. 
Alternatively, should this Court reverse the trial court.' s determination of the 
FLSA issue, R.D. Logging respectfully requests this Court remand the matter to the trial 
court for a re-trial of the issue in a manner consistent with this Court's opinion. 
Should this Court determine that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
grant Daday's motion to reopen the evidence, R.D. Logging respectfully requests this 
Court remand the matter to the trial for a new trial, or at minimum, to determine the 
affect of the interrogatory under the relevant rules of civil procedure and case law. 
3
 For these same reasons this Court should reject Daday's alternative request for relief, 
which is to simply find that the interrogatory answer at issue conclusively proved 
Daday's entitlement to five hours per week in overtime compensation. (Appellant's 
Brief, at 24.) 
16 
1/ ^ 
DATED TfflS K£_ day of July, 2002. 
/" 
Brent M. Brindley 
Bryan J. Pattison 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ((/) day of July 2002,1 served eight (8) copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to the Utah Court of Appeals and two (2) copies 
to Aaron J. Prisbrey, by depositing copies in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed 
to: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State 
P. O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230 
Aaron J. Prisbrey 
1071 East 100 South, Bldg. D, Suite 3 
St. George, UT 84770 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
%AA&-
r \ATTOHNEY CLIENT FILES_0FF1CE DATA\BBMNDLEY\R\R.a UXXMNO CO 9J37 OIVAPPELLATE BRIEF doc 
17 
Tab A 
"iLED 
-s£.':.iCT COURT 
23CIIUR 30 PM3: 17 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRIGT-d^ff-
FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD S.DADAY, ] 
Plaintiff; ] 
vs. ] 
R.D. LOGGING CO, INC, ] 
Defendant. ] 
I FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 990501638 
l Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before the Court for trial on February 20 and 21, 2001. Plaintiff 
was present and represented by his counsel, Aaron J. Prisbrey. Defendant was present 
through Barratt Nielson and represented by its counsel, Brent M. Brindley. Several legal 
issues were raised during the trial which could and should have been raised and resolved 
prior to trial. Having considered the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the Court makes 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT1 
1. Plaintiff was, at all relevant times, a resident of Washington County, Utah. 
2. Defendant was, at all relevant times, a Utah corporation having its principal 
*At the conclusion of Plaintiffs case in chief, Plaintiff made certain motions on which the Court 
ruled before the beginning of Defendant's evidence. The Court's findings and conclusions are stated in the 
record of the trial, and will not be repeated here. The findings made herein are only those necessary for the 
Court's ultimate conclusions. 
place of business in Washington County, Utah. 
3. Plaintiff worked as an employee of Defendant from January 1998 through 
March 19,1999. 
4. Defendant's business is the fabrication of custom cabinets and furniture, some 
of which have been sold in interstate commerce. 
5. Defendant was paid on a weekly basis, and was paid $720 each week of his 
employment by Defendant, except for the last week thereof; Defendant was never paid any 
overtime compensation. 
6. Plaintiffwas originally employed by Defendant to be a manager of Defendant's 
shop; Plaintiff testified, "I [could] run it [the shop] as though it were my own." 
7. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant kept records of Plaintiff's work hours; 
Defendant tried to get Plaintiff to record his work hours, but Plaintiff refused to do so. 
8. Plaintiff testified that he consistently worked more than forty hours per week 
for Defendant. Plaintiff testified that sixty hours per week "is a real safe average," but 
Plaintiff had no credible evidence of any specific number of hours worked in any specific 
week. The Court finds this testimony to be speculative, unsubstantiated, and unreliable. 
9. Plaintiff's wife testified that Plaintiff worked many hours atDefendant's shop, 
but had no credible evidence of any specific number of hours worked in any specific week. 
10. Plaintiff testified that he began work at 6:30 a.m., but witness Richard Carnley 
testified that Plaintiff arrived no earlier than 7:00 a.m. 
11. Plaintiff testified that his "average" work day ended at 6:00 or 7:00 p.m.. 
Witness Gary Slease testified that, on certain unidentified occasions, he saw Plaintiff 
working at Defendant's shop as late as 6:00 p.m., but he could not testify about what work 
Defendant was doing. Witness Camley testified that Plaintiff was at the shop longer than 
other employees. 
12. Plaintiff testified that he worked six or seven days per week until February 
1999. Defendant's witnesses testified that Sunday work was never required by Defendant 
and that Saturday work was virtually never required. The Court finds that Plaintiffs 
testimony is unreliable and is rebutted by more credible evidence. 
13. Plaintiff worked for Defendant for more than one year before claiming any 
entitlement to overtime compensation. 
14. Plaintiff spent significant time on personal work, not for Defendant, during the 
normal work hours of the shop; for example, Plaintiff built furniture to exchange for his own 
automotive repairs and built doors to trade for his own countertops. 
15. Plaintiff also parked his own travel trailer next to Defendant's shop, and 
worked on the reconstruction and remodeling of its interior during the normal work hours 
of Defendant's shop; witness Carnley testified that he saw improvements made by Plaintiff 
to his trailer which would have required three or four complete weeks of work to accomplish, 
and others of Defendant's employees who testified had witnessed Plaintiff working on his 
trailer during the normal work hours of the shop. 
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16. Defendant's representative, BarrattNielson, testified that Plaintiff didnot work 
the sixty hours per week that he claims because Plaintiff was working on his trailer during 
the normal work hours of the shop; witness Nielson further testified that he twice told 
Plaintiff to stop working on personal projects during work hours. 
17. Plaintiff testified that he took smoking breaks while at work, that he never 
smoked in the shop, and that he smoked a pack of cigarettes per day. 
18. Defendant adopted its first policy regarding sick leave and vacations on 
January 19,1999 (See Exhibit 6), two months before the end of Plaintiff's employment with 
Defendant. 
Having made the foregoing findings, the Court reaches the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Plaintiff's employment with Defendant was subject to the requirements of the 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act ('TSLA"). 
B. Defendant violated provisions of the FSLA by failing to keep records of 
Plaintiff's work hours. 
C. In these circumstances, Plaintiff still has the burden to prove "that [he] has in 
fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated and produceQ sufficient 
evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable 
inference." 48A AmJur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations §46.57. 
D. Plaintiff's testimony regarding his working of more than forty hours per week 
4 
is speculative, it fails to account for the time he took for smoking breaks and worked on 
personal projects rather than for Defendant, and is contradicted by more credible evidence. 
Plaintiff specifically testified, "You can't imagine the hours I put in in that place," but then 
left it to this Court to do that imagining. 
E. Plaintiff has failed to bear his burden of proof for overtime compensation. 
F. Defendant's policy for sick leave and vacations was not retroactive, and 
Plaintiff had no entitlement to compensation thereunder when his employment was 
terminated. 
G. Judgment should be entered for Defendant, with no award to Plaintiff, and the 
parties should bear their own costs and attorneys fees. 
H. Counsel for Defendant should submit an appropriate judgment pursuant to Rule 
4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration. 
Dated this day of March, 2001. 
6. RAND BEACHA\f JUDGE *— 
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TITLE 29. LABOR 
CHAPTER 8. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
29 USCS § 207 (2002) 
§ 207. Maximum hours 
(a) Employees engaged in interstate commerce; additional applicability to 
employees pursuant to subsequent amendatory provisions. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ 
any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the 
production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in 
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than 
forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in 
excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half 
times the regular rate at which he is employed. 
(2) No employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is 
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed 
in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, 
and who in such workweek is brought within the purview of this subsection by the 
amendments made to this Act [29 USCS § § 201 et seq.] by the Fair Labor 
Standards Amendments of 1966--
(A) for a workweek longer than forty-four hours during the first year from 
the effective date of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966 [effective 
Feb. 1, 1967], 
(B) for a workweek longer than f.orty-two hours during the second year from 
such date, or 
(C) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration of the 
second year from such date, 
unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of 
the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the 
regular rate at which he is employed. 
(b) Employment pursuant to collective bargaining agreement; employment by 
independently owned and controlled local enterprise engaged in distribution of 
petroleum products. No employer shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) 
by employing any employee for a workweek in excess of that specified in such 
subsection without paying the compensation for overtime employment prescribed 
therein if such employee is so employed--
(1) in pursuance of an agreement, made as a result of collective bargaining 
by representatives of employees certified as bona fide by the National Labor 
Relations Board, which provides that no employee shall be employed more than one 
thousand and forty hours during any period of twenty-six consecutive weeks; or 
(2) in pursuance of an agreement, made as a result of collective bargaining 
by representatives of employees certified as bona fide by the National Labor 
Relations Board, which provides that during a specified period of fifty-two 
consecutive weeks the employee shall be employed not more than two thousand two 
hundred and forty hours and shall be guaranteed not less than one thousand eight 
hundred and forty hours (or not less than forty-six weeks at the normal number 
of hours worked per week, but not less than thirty hours per week) and not more 
than two thousand and eighty hours of employment for which he shall receive 
compensation for all hours guaranteed or worked at rates not less than those 
applicable under the agreement to the work performed and for all hours in excess 
of the guaranty which are also in excess of the maximum workweek applicable to 
such employee under subsection (a) or two thousand and eighty in such period at 
rates not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is 
employed; or 
(3) by an independently owned and controlled local enterprise (including an 
enterprise with more than one bulk storage establishment) engaged in the 
wholesale or bulk distribution of petroleum products if--
(A) the annual gross volume of sales of such enterprise is less than $ 
1,000,000 exclusive of excise taxes, 
(B) more than 75 per centum of such enterprise's annual dollar volume of 
sales is made within the State in which such enterprise is located, and 
(C) not more than 25 per centum of the annual dollar volume of sales of 
such enterprise is to customers who are engaged in the bulk distribution of such 
products for resale, 
and such employee receives compensation for employment in excess of forty 
hours in any work-week at a rate not less than one and one-half times the 
minimum wage rate applicable to him under section 6 [29 USCS § 206], 
and if such employee receives compensation for employment in excess of twelve 
hours in any workday, or for employment in excess of fifty-six hours in any 
workweek, as the case may be, at a rate not less than one and one-half times the 
regular rate at which he is employed. 
(c), (d) [Repealed] 
(e) "Regular rate" defined. As used in this section the "regular rate" at which 
an employee is employed shall be deemed to include all remuneration for 
employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee, but shall not be deemed to 
include--
(1) sums paid as gifts; payments in the nature of gifts made at Christmas 
time or on other special occasions, as a reward for service, the amounts of 
which are not measured by or dependent on hours worked, production, or 
efficiency; 
(2) payments made for occasional periods when no work is performed due to 
vacation, holiday, illness, failure of the employer to provide sufficient work, 
or other similar cause; reasonable payments for traveling expenses, or other 
expenses, incurred by an employee in the furtherance of his employer's interests 
and properly reimbursable by the employer; and other similar payments to an 
employee which are not made as compensation for his hours of employment; 
(3) Sums paid in recognition of services performed during a given period if 
either, (a) both the fact that payment is to be made and the amount of the 
payment are determined at the sole discretion of the employer at or near the end 
of the period and not pursuant to any prior contract, agreement, or promise 
causing the employee to expect such payments regularly; or (b) the payments are 
made pursuant to a bona fide profit-sharing plan or trust or bona fide thrift or 
savings plan, meeting the requirements of the Administrator [Secretary] set 
forth in appropriate regulations which he shall issue, having due regard among 
other relevant factors, to the extent to which the amounts paid to the employee 
are determined without regard to hours of work, production, or efficiency; or 
(c) the payments are talent fees (as such talent fees are defined and delimited 
by regulations of the Administrator [Secretary]) paid to performers, including 
announcers, on radio and television programs; 
(4) contributions irrevocably made by an employer to a trustee or third 
person pursuant to a bona fide plan for providing old-age, retirement, life, 
accident, or health insurance or similar benefits for employees; 
(5) extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid for certain hours 
worked by the employee in any day or workweek because such hours are hours 
worked in excess of eight in a day or in excess of the maximum workweek 
applicable to such employee under subsection (a) or in excess of the employee's 
normal working hours or regular working hours, as the case may be; 
(6) extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid for work by the 
employee on Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, or regular days of rest, or on the 
sixth or seventh day of the workweek, where such premium rate is not less than 
one and one-half times the rate established in good faith for like work 
performed in nonovertime hours on other days; 
(7) extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid to the employee, in 
pursuance of an applicable employment contract or collective-bargaining 
agreement, for work outside of the hours established in good faith by the 
contract or agreement as the basic, normal, or regular workday (not exceeding 
eight hours) or workweek (not exceeding the maximum workweek applicable to such 
employee under subsection (a) [)], where such premium rate is not less than one 
and one-half times the rate established in good faith by the contract or 
agreement for like work performed during such workday or workweek; or 
(8) any value or income derived from employer-provided grants or rights 
provided pursuant to a stock option, stock appreciation right, or bona fide 
employee stock purchase program which is not otherwise excludable under any of 
paragraphs (1) through (7) if--
(A) grants are made pursuant to a program, the terms and conditions of 
which are communicated to participating employees either at the beginning of the 
employee's participation in the program or at the time of the grant; 
(B) in the case of stock options and stock appreciation rights, the grant 
or right cannot be exercisable for a period of at least 6 months after the time 
of grant (except that grants or rights may become exercisable because of an 
employee's death, disability, retirement, or a change in corporate ownership, or 
other circumstances permitted by regulation), and the exercise price is at least 
85 percent of the fair market value of the stock at the time of grant; 
(C) exercise of any grant or right is voluntary; and 
(D) any determinations regarding the award of, and the amount of, 
employer-provided grants or rights that are based on performance are--
(i) made based upon meeting previously established performance criteria 
(which may include hours of work, efficiency, or productivity) of any business 
unit consisting of at least 10 employees or of a facility, except that, any 
determinations may be based on length of service or minimum schedule of hours or 
days of work; or 
(ii) made based upon the past performance (which may include any 
criteria) of one or more employees in a given period so long as the 
determination is in the sole discretion of the employer and not pursuant to any 
prior contract. 
(f) Employment necessitating irregular hours of work. No employer shall be 
deemed to have violated subsection (a) by employing any employee for a workweek 
in excess of the maximum workweek applicable to such employee under subsection 
(a) if such employee is employed pursuant to a bona fide individual contract, or 
pursuant to an agreement made as a result of collective bargaining by 
representatives of employees, if the duties of such employee necessitate 
irregular hours of work, and the contract or agreement (1) specifies a regular 
rate of pay of not less than the minimum hourly rate provided in subsection (a) 
or (b) of section 6 [29 USCS § 206(a) or (b) ] (whichever may be applicable) and 
compensation at not less than one and one-half times such rate for all hours 
worked in excess of such maximum workweek, and (2) provides a weekly guaranty of 
pay for not more than sixty hours based on the rates so specified. 
(g) Employment at piece rates. No employer shall be deemed to have violated 
subsection (a) by employing any employee for a workweek in excess of the maximum 
workweek applicable to such employee under such subsection if, pursuant to an 
agreement or understanding arrived at between the employer and the employee 
before performance of the work, the amount paid to the employee for the number 
of hours worked by him in such workweek in excess of the maximum workweek 
applicable to such employee under such subsection--
(1) in the case of an employee employed at piece rates, is computed at piece 
rates not less than one and one-half times the bona fide piece rates applicable 
to the same work when performed during nonovertime hours; or 
(2) in the case of an employee performing two or more kinds of work for which 
different hourly or piece rates have been established, is computed at rates not 
less than one and one-half times such bona fide rates applicable to the same 
work when performed during non-overtime hours; or 
(3) is computed at a rate not less than one and one-half times the rate 
established by such agreement or understanding as the basic rate to be used in 
computing overtime compensation thereunder: Provided, That the rate so 
established shall be authorized by regulation by the Administrator [Secretary] 
as being substantially equivalent to the average hourly earnings of the 
employee, exclusive of overtime premiums, in the particular work over a 
representative period of time; 
and if (i) the employee's average hourly earnings for the workweek exclusive of 
payments described in paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (e) are not less 
than the minimum hourly rate required by applicable law, and (ii) extra overtime 
compensation is properly computed and paid on other forms of additional pay 
required to be included in computing the regular rate. 
(h) Sums excluded from regular rate; extra compensation creditable toward 
overtime compensation. 
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), sums excluded from the regular rate 
pursuant to subsection (e) shall not be creditable toward wages required under 
section 6 [29 USCS § 206] or overtime compensation required under this section. 
(2) Extra compensation paid as described in paragraphs (5), (6), and (7) of 
subsection (e) shall be creditable toward overtime compensation payable pursuant 
to this section. 
(i) Employment by retail or service establishment. No employer shall be deemed 
to have violated subsection (a) by employing any employee at a retail or service 
establishment for a workweek in excess of the applicable workweek specified 
therein, if (1) the regular rate of pay of such employee is in excess of one and 
one-half times the minimum hourly rate applicable to him under section 6 [29 
USCS § 206], and (2) more than half his compensation for a representative 
period (not less than one month) represents commissions on goods or services. In 
determining the proportion of compensation representing commissions, all 
earnings resulting from the application of a bona fide commission rate shall be 
deemed commissions on goods or services without regard to whether the computed 
commissions exceed the draw or guarantee. 
(j) Employment in hospital or establishment engaged in care of sick, aged, or 
mentally ill. No employer engaged in the operation of a hospital or an 
establishment which is an institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, 
the aged, or the mentally ill or defective who reside on the premises shall be 
deemed to have violated subsection (a) if, pursuant to an agreement or 
understanding arrived at between the employer and the employee before 
performance of the work, a work period of fourteen consecutive days is accepted 
in lieu of the workweek of seven consecutive days for purposes of overtime 
computation and if, for his employment in excess of eight hours in any workday 
and in excess of eighty hours in such fourteen-day period, the employee receives 
compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at 
which he is employed. 
(k) Employment by public agency engaged in fire protection or law enforcement 
activities. No public agency shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) 
with respect to the employment of any employee in fire protection activities or 
any employee in law enforcement activities (including security personnel in 
correctional institutions) if--
(1) in a work period of 28 consecutive days the employee receives for tours 
of duty which in the aggregate exceed the lesser of (A) 216 hours, or (B) the 
average number of hours (as determined by the Secretary pursuant to section 
6(c) (3) of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974) [29 USCS § 213 note] in 
tours of duty of employees engaged in such activities in work periods of 28 
consecutive days in calendar year 1975; or 
(2) in the case of such an employee to whom a work period of at least 7 but 
less than 28 days applies, in his work period the employee receives for tours of 
duty which in the aggregate exceed a number of hours which bears the same ratio 
to the number of consecutive days in his work period as 216 hours (or if lower, 
the number of hours referred to in clause (B) of paragraph (1)) bears to 28 
days, 
compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at 
which he is employed. 
(1) Employment in domestic service in one or more households. No employer shall 
employ any employee in domestic service in one or more households for a workweek 
longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for such 
employment in accordance with subsection (a). 
(m) Employment in tobacco industry. For a period or periods of not more than 
fourteen workweeks in the aggregate in any calendar year, any employer may 
employ any employee for a workweek in excess of that specified in subsection (a) 
without paying the compensation for overtime employment prescribed in such 
subsection, if such employee--
(1) is employed by such employer--
(A) to provide services (including stripping and grading) necessary and 
incidental to the sale at auction of green leaf tobacco of type 11, 12, 13, 14, 
21, 22, 23, 24, 31, 35, 36, or 37 (as such types are defined by the Secretary of 
Agriculture), or in auction sale, buying, handling, stemming, redrying, packing, 
and storing of such tobacco, 
(B) in auction sale, buying, handling, sorting, grading, packing, or 
storing green leaf tobacco of type 32 (as such type is defined by the Secretary 
of Agriculture), or 
(C) in auction sale, buying, handling, stripping, sorting, grading, 
sizing, packing, or stemming prior to packing, of perishable cigar leaf tobacco 
of type 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 61, or 62 (as such types are 
defined by the Secretary of Agriculture); and 
(2) receives for--
(A) such employment by such employer which is in excess of ten hours in 
any workday, and 
(B) such employment by such employer which is in excess of forty-eight 
hours in any workweek, 
compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate 
at which he is employed. 
An employer who receives an exemption under this subsection shall not be 
eligible for any other exemption under this section. 
(n) Employment by street, suburban, or interurban electric railway, or local 
trolley or motorbus carrier. In the case of an employee of an employer engaged 
in the business of operating a street, suburban or interurban electric railway, 
or local trolley or motorbus carrier (regardless of whether or not such railway 
or carrier is public or private or operated for profit or not for profit), in 
determining the hours of employment of such an employee to which the rate 
prescribed by subsection (a) applies there shall be excluded the hours such 
employee was employed in charter activities by such employer if (1) the 
employee's employment in such activities was pursuant to an agreement or 
understanding with his employer arrived at before engaging in such employment, 
and (2) if employment in such activities is not part of such employee's regular 
employment. 
(o) Compensatory time. 
(1) Employees of a public agency which is a State, a political subdivision of 
a State, or an interstate governmental agency may receive, in accordance with 
this subsection and in lieu of overtime compensation, compensatory time off at a 
rate not less than one and one-half hours for each hour of employment for which 
overtime compensation is required by this section. 
(2) A public agency may provide compensatory time under paragraph (1) only--
(A) pursuant to--
(i) applicable provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, 
memorandum of understanding, or any other agreement between the public agency 
and representatives of such employees; or 
(ii) in the case of employees not covered by subclause (i), an 
agreement or understanding arrived at between the employer and employee before 
the performance of the work; and 
(B) if the employee has not accrued compensator]/- time in excess of the 
limit applicable to the employee prescribed by paragraph (3). 
In the case of employees described in clause (A) (ii) hired prior to April 15, 
1986, the regular practice in effect on April 15, 1986, with respect to 
compensatory time off for such employees in lieu of the receipt of overtime 
compensation, shall constitute an agreement or understanding under such clause 
(A) (ii). Except as provided in the previous sentence, the provision of 
compensatory time off to such employees for hours worked after April 14, 1986, 
shall be in accordance with this subsection. 
(3) (A) If the work of an employee for which compensatory time may be 
provided included work in a public safety activity, an emergency response 
activity, or a seasonal activity, the employee engaged in such work may accrue 
not more than 480 hours of compensatory time for hours worked after April 15, 
1986. If such work was any other work, the employee engaged in such work may 
accrue not more than 24 0 hours of compensatory time for hours worked after April 
15, 1986. Any such employee who, after April 15, 1986, has accrued 480 or 240 
hours, as the case may be, of compensatory time off shall, for additional 
overtime hours of work, be paid overtime compensation. 
(B) If compensation is paid to an employee for accrued compensatory time 
off, such compensation shall be paid at the regular rate earned by the employee 
at the time the employee receives such payment. 
(4) An employee who has accrued compensatory time off authorized to be 
provided under paragraph (1) shall, upon termination of employment, be paid for 
the unused compensatory time at a rate of compensation not less than--
(A) the average regular rate received by such employee during the last 3 
years of the employeefs employment, or 
(B) the final regular rate received by such employee, 
whichever is higher[.] 
(5) An employee of a public agency which is a State, political subdivision of 
a State, or an interstate governmental agency--
(A) who has accrued compensatory time off authorized to be provided under 
paragraph (1), and 
(B) who has requested the use of such compensatory time, 
shall be permitted by the employee's employer to use such time within a 
reasonable period after making the request if the use of the compensatory time 
does not unduly disrupt the operations of the public agency. 
(6) The hours an employee of a public agency performs court reporting 
transcript preparation duties shall not be considered as hours worked for the 
purposes of subsection (a) if--
(A) such employee is paid at a per-page rate which is not less than--
(i) the maximum rate established by State law or local ordinance for 
the jurisdiction of such public agency, 
(ii) the maximum rate otherwise established by a judicial or 
administrative officer and in effect on July 1, 1995, or 
(iii) the rate freely negotiated between the employee and the party 
requesting the transcript, other than the judge who presided over the 
proceedings being transcribed, and 
(B) the hours spent performing such duties are outside of the hours such 
employee performs other work (including hours for which the agency requires the 
employee's attendance) pursuant to the employment relationship with such public 
agency. 
For purposes of this section, the amount paid such employee in accordance 
with subparagraph (A) for the performance of court reporting transcript 
preparation duties, shall not be considered in the calculation of the regular 
rate at which such employee is employed. 
(7) For purposes of this subsection--
(A) the term "overtime compensation" means the compensation required by 
subsection (a), and 
(B) the terms "compensatory time" and "compensatory time off" mean hours 
during which an employee is not working, which are not counted as hours worked 
during the applicable workweek or other work period for purposes of overtime 
compensation, and for which the employee is compensated at the employee's 
regular rate. 
(p) Special detail work for fire protection and law enforcement employees; 
occasional or sporadic employment; substitution. 
(1) If an individual who is employed by a State, political subdivision of a 
State, or an interstate governmental agency in fire protection or law 
enforcement activities (including activities of security personnel in 
correctional institutions) and who, solely at such individual's option, agrees 
to be employed on a special detail by a separate or independent employer in fire 
protection, law enforcement, or related activities, the hours such individual 
was employed by such separate and independent employer shall be excluded by the 
public agency employing such individual in the calculation of the hours for 
which the employee is entitled to overtime compensation under this section if 
the public agency--
(A) requires that its employees engaged in fire protection, law 
enforcement, or security activities be hired by a separate and independent 
employer to perform the special detail, 
(B) facilitates the employment of such employees by a separate and 
independent employer, or 
(C) otherwise affects the condition of employment of such employees by a 
separate and independent employer. 
(2) If an employee of a public agency which is a State, political subdivision 
of a State, or an interstate governmental agency undertakes, on an occasional or 
sporadic basis and solely at the employee's option, part-time employment for the 
public agency which is in a different capacity from any capacity in which the 
employee is regularly employed with the public agency, the hours such employee 
was employed in performing the different employment shall be excluded by the 
public agency in the calculation of the hours for which the employee is entitled 
to overtime compensation under this section. 
(3) If an individual who is employed in any capacity by a public agency which 
is a State, political subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental 
agency, agrees, with the approval of the public agency and solely at the option 
of such individual, to substitute during scheduled work hours for another 
individual who is employed by such agency in the same capacity, the hours such 
employee worked as a substitute shall be excluded by the public agency in the 
calculation of the hours for which the employee is entitled to overtime 
compensation under this section. 
(q) Maximum hour exemption for employees receiving remedial education. Any 
employer may employ any employee for a period or periods of not more than 10 
hours in the aggregate in any workweek in excess of the maximum workweek 
specified in subsection (a) without paying the compensation for overtime 
employment prescribed in such subsection, if during such period or periods the 
employee is receiving remedial education that is--
(1) provided to employees who lack a high school diploma or educational 
attainment at the eighth grade level; 
(2) designed to provide reading and other basic skills at an eighth grade 
level or below; and 
(3) does not include job specific training. 
HISTORY: (June 25, 1938, ch 676, § 7, 52 Stat. 1063; Oct. 29, 1941, ch 461, 
55 Stat. 756; July 20, 1949, ch 352, § 1, 63 Stat. 446; Oct. 26, 1949, ch 736, 
§ § 7, 16(f), 63 Stat. 912, 920; May 5, 1961, P.L. 87-30, § 6, 75 Stat. 69; 
Sept. 23, 1966, P.L. 89-601, Title II, § § 204(c), (d), 212(b), Title IV, § § 
401-403, 80 Stat. 835-837, 841, 842; April 8, 1974, P.L. 93-259, § § 
6(c)(1)(A), 7(b)(2), 9(a), 12(b), 19 (a) - (c) , 21(a), 88 Stat. 60, 62, 64, 66, 68; 
Nov. 13, 1985, P.L. 99-150, § § 2(a), 3(a), (b), (c)(1), 99 Stat. 787, 789; 
Nov. 17, 1989, P.L. 101-157, § 7, 103 Stat. 944.) 
(As amended Sept. 6, 1995, P.L. 104-26, § 2, 109 Stat. 264; May 18, 2000, 
P.L. 106-202, § 2(a), (b), 114 Stat. 308.) 
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§ 516.2 Employees subject to minimum wage or minimum wage and overtime 
provisions pursuant to section 6 or sections 6 and 7(a) of the Act. 
(a) Items required. Every employer shall maintain and preserve payroll or 
other records containing the following information and data with respect to each 
employee to whom section 6 or both sections 6 and 7(a) of the Act apply: 
(1) Name in full, as used for Social Security recordkeeping purposes, and on 
the same record, the employee's identifying symbol or number if such is used in 
place of name on any time, work, or payroll records, 
(2) Home address, including zip code, 
(3) Date of birth, if under 19, 
(4) Sex and occupation in which employed (sex may be indicated by use of the 
prefixes Mr., Mrs., Miss., or Ms.) (Employee's sex identification is related to 
the equal pay provisions of the Act which are administered by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. Other equal pay recordkeeping requirements 
are contained in 29 CFR part 1620.) 
(5) Time of day and day of week on which the employee's workweek begins (or 
for employees employed under section 7 (k) of the Act, the starting time and 
length of each employee's work period). If the employee is part of a workforce 
or employed in or by an establishment all of whose workers have a workweek 
beginning at the same time on the same day, a single notation of the time of the 
day and beginning day of the workweek for the whole workforce or establishment 
will suffice, 
(6)(i) Regular hourly rate of pay for any workweek in which overtime 
compensation is due under section 7(a) of the Act, (ii) explain basis of pay by 
indicating the monetary amount paid on a per hour, per day, per week, per piece, 
commission on sales, or other basis, and (iii) the amount and nature of each 
payment which, pursuant to section 7(e) of the Act, is excluded from the 
"regular rate" (these records may be in the form of vouchers or other payment 
data), 
(7) Hours worked each workday and total hours worked each workweek (for 
purposes of this section, a "workday" is any fixed period of 24 consecutive 
hours and a "workweek" is any fixed and regularly recurring period of 7 
consecutive workdays), 
(8) Total daily or weekly straight-time earnings or wages due for hours 
worked during the workday or workweek, exclusive of premium overtime 
compensation, 
(9) Total premium pay for overtime hours. This amount excludes the straight-
time earnings for overtime hours recorded under paragraph (a)(8) of this 
section, 
(10) Total additions to or deductions from wages paid each pay period 
including employee purchase orders or wage assignments. Also, in individual 
employee records, the dates, amounts, and nature of the items which make up the 
total additions and deductions, 
(11) Total wages paid each pay period, 
(12) Date of payment and the pay period covered by payment. 
(b) Records of retroactive payment of wages. Every employer who makes 
retroactive payment of wages or compensation under the supervision of the 
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division pursuant to section 16(c) and/or 
section 17 of the Act, shall: 
(1) Record and preserve, as an entry on the pay records, the amount of such 
payment to each employee, the period covered by such payment, and the date of 
payment. 
(2) Prepare a report of each such payment on a receipt form provided by or 
authorized by the Wage and Hour Division, and (i) preserve a copy as part of the 
records, (ii) deliver a copy to the employee, and (iii) file the original, as 
evidence of payment by the employer and receipt by the employee, with the 
Administrator or an authorized representative within 10 days after payment is 
made. 
(c) Employees working on fixed schedules. With respect to employees working 
on fixed schedules, an employer may maintain records showing instead of the 
hours worked each day and each workweek as required by paragraph (a)(7) of this 
section, the schedule of daily and weekly hours the employee normally works. 
Also, 
(1) In weeks in which an employee adheres to this schedule, indicates by 
check mark, statement or other method that such hours were in fact actually 
worked by him, and 
(2) In weeks in which more or less than the scheduled hours are worked, 
shows that exact number of hours worked each day and each week. 
HISTORY: 52 FR 24896, July 1, 1987. 
AUTHORITY: Sec. 11, 52 Stat. 1066, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 211. Section 516.33 
also issued under 52 Stat. 1060, as amended; 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. Section 
516.34 also issued under Sec. 7, 103 Stat. 944, 29 U.S.C. 207(q). 
NOTES: NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE SUBTITLE: 
CROSS REFERENCES: Railroad Retirement Board: See Employees' Benefits, 20 CFR 
chapter II. 
Social Security Administration: See Employees' Benefits, 20 CFR chapter III. 
EDITORIAL NOTE: Other regulations issued by the Department of Labor appear in 20 
CFR chapters I, IV, V, VI, VII; 30 CFR chapter I; 41 CFR chapters 50, 60, and 
61; and 4 8 CFR chapter 29. 
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§ 778.223 Pay for non-productive hours distinguished. 
Under the Act an employee must be compensated for all hours worked. As a general rule 
the term "hours worked" will include: (a) All time during which an employee is required to be 
on duty or to be on the employer's premises or at a prescribed workplace and (b) all time 
during which an employee is suffered or permitted to work whether or not he is required to 
do so. Thus, working time is not limited to the hours spent in active productive labor, but 
includes time given by the employee to the employer even though part of the time may be 
spent in idleness. Some of the hours spent by employees; under certain circumstances^in 
such activities as waiting for work, remaining "on call", traveling on the employer's business 
or to and from workplaces, and in meal periods and rest periods are regarded as working 
time and some are not. The governing principles are discussed in part 785 of this chapter 
(interpretative bulletin on "hours worked") and part 790 of this chapter (statement of effect 
of Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947). To the extent that these hours are regarded as working time, 
payment made as compensation for these hours obviously cannot be characterized as 
"payments not for hours worked." Such compensation is treated in the same manner as 
compensation for any other working time and is, of course, included in the regular rate of 
pay. Where payment is ostensibly made as compensation for such of these hours as are not 
regarded as working time under the Act, the payment is nevertheless included in the regular 
rate of pay unless it qualifies for exclusion from the regular rate as one of a type of 
"payments made for occasional periods when no work is performed due to * * * failure of the 
employer to provide sufficient work, or other similar cause" as discussed in § 778.218 or is 
excludable on some other basis under section 7(e)(2). For example, an employment contract 
may provide that employees who are assigned to take calls for specific periods will receive a 
payment of $ 5 for each 8-hour period during which they are "on call" in addition to pay at 
their regular (or overtime) rate for hours actually spent in making calls. If the employees who 
are thus on call are not confined to their homes or to any particular place, but may come and 
go as they please, provided that they leave word where they may be reached, the hours 
spent "on call" are not considered as hours worked. Although the payment received by such 
employees for such "on call" time is, therefore, not allocable to any specific hours of work, it 
is clearly paid as compensation for performing a duty involved in the employee's job and is 
not of a type excludable under section 7(e)(2). The payment must therefore be included in 
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the employee's regular rate in the same manner as any payment for services, such as an 
attendance bonus, which is not related to any specific hours of work. 
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employees to use the shop for their personal projects, 
(inaudible) on Sunday. But, certainly, there was no 
requirement that anyone would work on Sunday to complete 
company projects. 
We heard testimony from Mr. Daday's wife, Stephanie, 
that she would drop him off usually at 6:30 in the morning and 
pick him up. However, it was her testimony that normally she 
would pick him up by at least by 5 o'clock, sometimes even 
earlier, occasionally later. But she testified she had never 
been into the shop. She didn't know what he was doing. If you 
calculate, even assuming that he left by four or 5 o'clock he 
was there a couple extra hours every day, if you take into 
consideration the tremendous amount of personal work that he 
was doing, it's pretty easy to see where all of that overtime 
work was being done. 
The testimony of Gary Slease, he testified that he saw 
plaintiff in the shop after hours. Testified the shop was 
closed on Saturdays and Sundays. His testimony was he had no 
idea what Mr. Daday was working on during that time. 
Going to the legal issues, Your Honor, we believe that 
per the Fair Labor Standards Act, Mr. Daday is entitled to 
overtime compensation simply because any hours that he was 
working at the shop in excess of the 40 hours a week were 
dedicated to personal projects or personal time spent in the 
trailer. 
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1 MR. PRISBREY: Your Honor, I'm going to object to this 
2 J for the mere reason we had answers in our discovery requests, 
3 J answers to interrogatories where we asked what the claim was, 
4 J the amount of wage, the amount of time that my client worked 
5 I there. Communication was they felt it was 45 hours per week. 
6 And therefs not been evidence anywhere of any less than 45. I 
7 didn't offer the interrogatories. But this is a new defense 
8 that I never heard before that it could be under 40 hours per 
9 week. They bound themselves to at least 45 hours per week in 
10 interrogatories. Now I'm hearing this for the first time it's 
11 40 hours or under. We have a specific request — we asked 
12 them, "State how many hours plaintiff worked on a weekly basis 
13 from January 1 to December 31. 
14 "Plaintiff worked an average of 45 hours per week." 
15 THE COURT: But that's not in evidence. 
16 MR. PRISBREY: I understand it's not in evidence. But 
17 I think he is estopped from raising these other arguments where 
18 he's saying, well, it could have been 40 hours per week. I 
19 didn't put it on because.I didn't think they had any evidence 
20 that got anywhere close to 40 hours per week. But I just think 
21 it's inappropriate where they made that admission in legal 
22 paperwork, now he's arguing it otherwise. 
23 I THE COURT: Well, I'll allow the argument to continue. 
24 I have to deal with the evidence that is presented. 
25 MR. BRINDLEY: Your Honor, going to the issue of 
liquidated damages. I believe it's section 216. Under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act is the statute that provides for the 
payment of liquidated damages. However, in section 29, U.S. 
Code Annotated 260, it provides, "In any action commenced prior 
to (inaudible) 14, 1947, (inaudible) minimum wage under the 
overtime compensation or liquidated damages under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, if the employer shows to the satisfaction 
of the court that the act or omissions giving rise to a 
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act as amended, the court 
may, in its sound discretion, award (inaudible) damages or 
award any amount conceived not specified in 216." 
What the statute says, if there is a violation of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, our position is that there was not, 
that there was no overtime worked to which they are to have 
compensation. 
If there was, and a violation to your satisfaction was 
not done (inaudible), then it is appropriate to ask for an 
award of liquidated damages. This is a situation where Mr. 
Daday was hired to manage the shop. It was understood that he 
was going to be there and do those jobs. He started working on 
all of these other projects. Any non-compliance on the part of 
the R.D. Logging Company was either because Mr. Daday failed to 
submit the hourly records or simply because there was no act in 
bad faith on their part. We would request, pursuant to that 
statute, that there be no award of liquidated damages if it is 
oo 
1 found that there was some overtime worked to which he is 
2 entitled to compensation. 
3 J The Fair Labor Standards Act does not contain a 
4 J typical attorneys fees provision. They are not entitled to 
5 attorney fees thereunder. However, the Utah attorneyfs fees 
6 statute does say if an action is asserted without merit, then 
7 in the absence of good faith, that the opposing party may be 
8 entitled to award of fees. It was determined that Mr. Daday 
9 really had no merit seeking this claim, but we would request 
10 payment of our fees to be submitted by affidavit. Thank you, 
11 I Your Honor. 
12 MR. PRISBREY: Your Honor — 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Brindley. Go ahead 
14 Mr. Prisbrey. 
15 MR. PRISBREY: Your Honor, we did have some answers to 
16 I interrogatories. I did not put those on in my case in chief. 
17 I didn't think there was any evidence presented that Mr. Daday 
18 worked under 45 hours per week. I was aware of that admission. 
19 I would ask that the record be opened so we could simply 
20 provide the court with a copy of the answers to interrogatories 
21 of the admission that was made, because I wasn't aware of that 
22 I until we were sitting here in closing statements, that that was 
23 I even contemplated. 
24 THE COURT: All right. That's a motion to reopen the 
25 evidence? 
MR. PRISBREY: Yes. Simply for the purpose of 
entering a response to one interrogatory which was responded to 
by Mr. Nielsen. 
THE COURT: Okay. What's the law regarding reopening 
evidence once the case is closed? 
MR. PRISBREY: It's my understanding, Your Honor, that 
the case can be reopened if there is adequate basis to do so. 
THE COURT: It sounds like one of those bases that 
sounds real good to an appellate court, which really means 
we'll let you know later what the standard is. Is there any 
actual standard? 
MR. PRISBREY: I'm not aware of it. 
THE COURT: It there a rule that governs that? If you 
know without looking. I don't recall myself. 
MR. PRISBREY: I don't, Your Honor. It's just my 
understanding of if there's ever — if you are in trial, if you 
are in closing statements, or any point in time if an issue 
arises, obviously, you have to raise it at that point. I think 
an issue's arisen for the first time in closing arguments. And 
we just want to supplement what we think was in our case. I 
don't think there was any evidence to support the position that 
he worked under 40 hours per week, under 45 hours per week for 
that matter. But I think that counsel had estopped himself 
from making that argument when he signed interrogatories 
himself saying, Oh, we think he worked 45 hours per week. And 
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that was my point, Your Honor, I think, on that basis. We 
should be entitled to the record on that one limited issue. We 
don't want all the interrogatories, just the answer on that 
one. 
motion? 
THE COURT: Um-hmm. Mr. Brindley, what about the 
MR. BRINDLEY: Your Honor, that motion should be 
denied. The evidence has been closed. I would simply argue to 
conform to the evidence that came on at trial. 
THE COURT: Oh, so you are suggesting you just modify 
your argument to the — you were arguing the evidence as it 
came out at trial or you would argue that — 
MR. BRINDLEY: Yes. No, I did. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you know if there's a rule 
governing reopening the evidence? 
MR. BRINDLEY: I'm not familiar with that rule. 
THE COURT: I'm not either. All right. For the sake 
of the argument on the motion, is it correct that there is an 
interrogatory answer somewhere that says that the defendant 
didn't work more than 45 hours a week? 
MR. PRISBREY: I believe so, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Would reopening the evidence then 
mean that your client would then want to respond or explain 
that answer? 
MR. PRISBREY: Urn, possibly. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything further on the 
motion, Mr. Prisbrey? 
MR. PRISBREY: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. I'll have to take the 
motion under advisement. I don't think the fact of the 
interrogatory answer is at issue. I don't know whether this is 
sufficient ground to reopen the evidence. So I'll just have to 
see what I can find on that. 
MR. PRISBREY: Your Honor, I don't have a question on 
(inaudible) the issue. Would it be all right if I made a 
proffer as to the relative to the interrogatory? 
THE COURT: Sure, if there's more than what I've 
already been told. 
MR. PRISBREY: I don't know if I — I don't know if I 
read the whole interrogatory. I just want to make sure we have 
a record on that. 
THE COURT: You just mentioned it. 
MR. PRISBREY: Discovery, if we present evidence on 
this issue, Your Honor, the evidence would show that on 
January 26th of 2000, I received in my office a document 
entitled Defendant's Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories to Defendants, which is a 15 page document 
which was signed and notarized. It was signed by Barrett 
Nielsen on January 21 and notarized by Jean Smith, a notary 
public on that day. And interrogatory number 47, asked the 
?6 
1 question, "State how many hours plaintiff worked on a weekly 
2 basis from the time period January 1, 1998 to December 31, 
3 1998." 
4 I "ANSWER: Plaintiff worked an average of 45 hours per 
5 week. And that was also signed on page 15 by Brent Brindley as 
6 attorney for defendant, R. D. Logging Company. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. 
8 MR. PRISBREY: Your Honor, I just had a brief 
9 rebuttal, if I could? 
10 THE COURT: Yes, go ahead. 
11 MR. PRISBREY: One issue was brought up relative to 
12 this good faith defense to liquidated damages. And I think 
13 J it's one of those things, if you are looking at it, probably 
14 under a traditional analysis, you would say, well, they may 
15 I well have acted in good faith. I donft know if they did or not 
16 J under that analysis. But there is a different standard that 
17 applies under the Fair Labor Standards Act. In order to 
18 prevail on this good faith defense, they have to show that they 
19 J took steps. Ignorance of the law in this matter is not a good 
20 faith defense. They have to take those affirmative steps in 
21 J order to ensure compliance with the law. And they did not do 
22 so. I don't think there's been any evidence presented to the 
23 J court that there was a good faith basis to avoid an award of 
24 liquidated damages in this matter. And I think I covered 
25 everything else. I'm not going to beat a dead dog, a dead 
